CO129-018 - Others - 1846 — Page 485

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REPORT ON

Were our colonial authority and establishment at some island or position to the northward, near the central regions of China, we should most probably obtain considerable moral influence over an intelligent and respectable class of Chinese, who would communicate their favour- able ideas to other and distant parts of the empire; and by extending a knowledge of our language, pave the way for the introduction of Chris- tianity. An English city at Chusan, for example, surrounded by an extensive agricultural population (the best disposed and most orderly in China as well as elsewhere), and evincing all the benefits of the science and skill of Europe, would have a remarkable effect on the Chinese, whose inquisitiveness and imitative powers would soon induce them to copy those things which would conduce to their physical, and ultimately to their moral and religious improvement.

Political point of view. Hong Kong was occupied by our troops and merchants in 1840-41, at a period when our trade was driven from Canton; when we were in hostility to the Chinese Govern- ment; and when the Portuguese authorities at Macao had expressed their inability to permit, as usual, British residence and resort to that port. At this period, the views of Captain Elliot were solely directed towards Canton. Hong Kong was then deemed the most eligible spot for British occupation, on political and military grounds. And so it proved, as long as the operations were being directed against Canton, and we were excluded from China. northward, occupying Chusan, and ultimately making peace and open- ing five ports (including Canton) for free commercial resort, English But on our proceeding to the residence, and the establishment of a ship of war at each, the political and mercantile value of Hong Kong entirely ceased. The late war has shown us the vulnerable point of China, namely, the Yang-tze-kiang river, which is aptly denominated by the Chinese, the Empire." directed at once towards Nankin, and other places on the Yang-tze- In the event of any future bostilities, our force would be "Girdle of the kiang river, and not against Canton. It is by interrupting the supplies of grain, and cutting off the trade of the great artery or grand canal, that we can, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure, terminate hostilities with China. Kong is utterly valueless. Our position must be Chusan, from its con- To accomplish this most desirable result, Hong tiguity to the scene of war, from its comparative salubrity, safe haven, and capability of supplying provisions, both from the resources of the island itself, and from the contiguous coast. and transports may rendezvous at Chusan, and select, at will, the most fitting period of the year for offensive operations. No attack need be A fleet of ships of war apprehended from the Chinese. kiang for the use of steamers. Ships from Singapore and the south- Coal is abundant in the Yang-tze- ward, can now, by reason of a greater knowledge of the winds and cur- rents, reach Chusan, even against the monsoon, in nearly the same time they would occupy in reaching Hong Kong. And, finally, the Chinese Government, aware of our position, would be the less disposed to break the peace, and would cease to rely so much as they now do on the strength of the forts in the Canton river. Government is to keep foreigners at the extremity of the empire; but the sagacious reasons which dictate this policy, ought to render us the The policy of the Chinese

HONG KONG.

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more anxious to operate in a counter direction. fortifications, very strong, and apparently well provided with artillery, at the Bogue. With Chinese gunners these forts would prove, even at present, formidable to an invading force; but well manned by European or American artillerymen, the Bogue might be made almost as impreg- nable as the Dardanelles.

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There are not, indeed, any fairly assignable grounds for the political or military occupancy of Hong Kong, even if there were no expenses attending that occupancy. The Government of China is sufficiently civilized to respect the persons and property of British subjects at Canton before any declaration of war took place, which, however, is an event of very remote probability for many years to come, if we retain Chusan; and as the Treaty with China provides for the stationing of a ship of war at Whampoa or Canton, a better security is thus provided for any British residents at Canton than Hong Kong could afford. The climate of Hong Kong will not admit of the island being made a garrison for our troops; and in the event of another war with China, an invading army must proceed from India, unless we keep a small military But a very small effective force and naval establishment at Chusan.

enormous expense; and the can be maintained here, unless at an impracticability of fortifying an island which is commanded by the hills around, and by any large battery erected on the opposite shore, is now generally acknowledged, and is in further corroboration of the inutility of Hong Kong.

That the

On a review of the whole question, and examining the island in all aspects-making even allowance for the newness of the settlement-and admitting, for argument sake, that, ultimately, there may be some trade at Hong Kong, it appears to me very advisable, if Hong Kong be retained as a British station or colony, that the civil establishment of the colony be cut down to a scale commensurate with the resources and wants of the island; and that the supernumerary officers be provided for That the European and Sepoy in other colonies, as vacancies occur. troops be removed, and a portion of the 1st Ceylon regiment (Malays) be kept at Hong Kong, in aid of the civil power. That a frigate or sloop of war be always stationed in the harbour, with an extra comple- ment of marines, to be landed only in case of emergency. British and other respectable inhabitants who are householders, be formed into a municipal body, with power to assess themselves for the police, lighting, drainage, and street-making, &c., of Victoria; that the harbour be a free port, open to ships under every flag; and that encouragement be given for the resort to and settlement on the island of other European nations. If this be done, a few years will determine whether it be possible to create any trade, or induce any resort to Hong Kong. Large government establishments, and an immense outlay of the public money for the last three years, have produced no beneficial result; let the opium traders, and those who choose to resort thither, have a voice in the management of the affairs of the colony. There can scarcely be less general trade--less prosperity-less security to life and property, than now exists, with a large garrison on shore and a flect in the harbour.

If there were any one advantage-political, commercial, financial, or religious, present or prospective-derivable to England from the